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Recent research in statistical reasoning has focused on the developmental process in 
students when learning statistical reasoning skills. This study investigates statistical 
reasoning from the perspective of individual differences. As manifestation of 
heterogeneity, students’ prior attitudes toward statistics, measured by the extended 
Survey of Attitudes Toward Statistics (SATS), are used (Schau, Stevens, Dauphinee & 
DeVecchio, 1995). Students’ statistical reasoning abilities are identified by the 
Statistical Reasoning Assessment (SRA) instrument (Garfield 1996, 1998a, 2003). 
The aim of the study is to investigate the relationship between attitudes and reasoning 
abilities by estimating a full structural equation model. Instructional implications of 
the model for the teaching of statistical reasoning are discussed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent research into statistical reasoning about variation, distribution, and sampling 
distributions has created important insights into the developmental process of statistical 
reasoning skills. Most research has focused on the identification of subsequent, 
hierarchically-ordered stages of reasoning development by means of qualitative research 
methods such as thinking-aloud sessions and in-depth interviews. Two recent special 
issues of this journal (SERJ, Ben-Zvi & Garfield, 2004b; Garfield & Ben-Zvi, 2005) and 
an edited volume (Ben-Zvi & Garfield, 2004a) contain a wealth of such empirical studies 
into the cognitive process of developing reasoning abilities and of instructional tools that 
might foster these developments. The present research investigates statistical reasoning 
from a somewhat different perspective. It examines individual differences among 
students learning statistics and statistical reasoning. These individual differences 
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demonstrate much variability: Students enter learning processes with different 
background characteristics and different perceptions of the learning context. As a 
manifestation of students’ heterogeneity, this study uses students’ prior attitudes toward 
statistics. The main aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between students’ 
attitudes toward statistics and their prior statistical reasoning abilities when entering an 
introductory statistics course.  
Contemporary research in statistics education distinguishes an array of different but 
related cognitive processes in learning statistics: statistical literacy, statistical reasoning, 
and statistical thinking. See for example the special section of the Journal of Statistics 
Education (Short, 2002), the two special issues of SERJ (Ben-Zvi & Garfield, 2004b; 
Garfield & Ben-Zvi, 2005), Ben-Zvi and Garfield (2004a), and Pfannkuch and Wild 
(2004). The demarcation of these three cognitive processes not being complete, it is well 
accepted that statistical literacy represents the most basic skills (Ben-Zvi & Garfield, 
2004c). Gal (2004) distinguishes two interrelated components in statistical literacy: the 
ability to “interpret and critically evaluate statistical information, data-related arguments, 
and stochastic phenomena,” and the ability to “discuss or communicate” these (see also 
Rumsey, 2002). Statistical reasoning is the ability to “explain why a particular result is 
expected or has occurred, or explain why it is appropriate to select a particular model or 
representation” (delMas, 2004a; see also Garfield & Chance, 2000; Garfield, 2002). 
Statistical thinking involves an “understanding of why and how statistical investigations 
are conducted and the ‘big ideas’ that underlie statistical investigations” (Ben-Zvi & 
Garfield, 2004; see also Pfannkuch & Wild, 2004; Chance, 2002). Literacy, reasoning, 
and thinking are to some extent achieved even before formal schooling in statistics takes 
place. Those naïve conceptions learned outside school can be correct or incorrect in 
nature.  
In the 1970s, cognitive research into statistical and probabilistic reasoning revealed 
several categories of fallacies in human reasoning, with examples such as the ‘Law of 
small numbers,’ the ‘Representativeness misconception’ (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982), the ‘Outcome orientation’ (Konold, 1989), and the ‘Equiprobability bias’ 
(Lecoutre, 1992). Most of that research is documented in the seminal work of Kahneman 
et al. (1982), as cited in Garfield and Ahlgren (1988). In the decades thereafter, following 
the reform movement in statistics education, research shifted its focus from probabilistic 
reasoning to reasoning with data (Pfannkuch & Wild, 2004), as evidenced in the topics of 
the recent series of SRTL research forums and the compilation of their major 
contributions in Ben-Zvi and Garfield (2004a).  
Another important development in recent decades is the design of assessment 
instruments for statistical literacy, reasoning, and thinking (delMas, 2002; Garfield & 
Ben-Zvi, 2004a). Paraphrasing Chance (2002), ‘if not assessed, it cannot be valuable,’ 
and assessment instruments were needed to match the focus on literacy, reasoning, and 
thinking. Several instruments also grew out of the need for assessment tasks that could be 
used in the context of research projects. Quantitative assessment instruments are still 
scarce, and are all derived from the first and most prominent instrument in the field: 
Statistical Reasoning Assessment (SRA). The SRA was developed by Konold and 
Garfield (Konold, 1989; Garfield, 1996, 1998a, 2003) as part of a project evaluating the 
effectiveness of a new statistics curriculum in U.S. high schools. The instrument is based 
on the well-described classes of misconceptions and their antipodes, the learned or 
unlearned correct conceptions, that emerged from the cognitive science research into 
reasoning fallacies (Garfield, 2003; Garfield & Ahlgren, 1988). In current terminology – 
the SRA was developed long before recent discussions on the demarcation of literacy, 
reasoning, and thinking – fallacies addressed in the SRA are of all three types. Being 80 
 
 
designed in the earlier stages of the reform movement in statistics education (Ben-Zvi & 
Garfield, 2004c), the SRA focuses both on statistical and probabilistic reasoning. Newer 
assessment instruments, related to the SRA but focusing more strongly on reasoning with 
data, are currently being developed in the framework of the Assessment Resource Tools 
for Improving Statistical Thinking (ARTIST) project (delMas, 2004b; see also 
https://app.gen.umn.edu/artist/). As newer instruments were not yet available, the SRA 
was the most appropriate tool at the time of this study to assess students’ reasoning 
abilities in the large-scale applications typical of educational practice. 
Empirical studies on statistical reasoning focus predominantly on the cognitive 
developmental process students go through when learning reasoning abilities, and on the 
instructional tools that may foster these developments. The large majority of these studies 
are empirical in nature in that they use descriptions, often achieved by thinking-aloud 
sessions or interviews of the cognitive states of students, to reconstruct a developmental 
trajectory (Ben-Zvi & Garfield, 2004a). Garfield and Ben-Zvi (2004b, p. 399) ascertain 
“It may seem strange, given the quantitative nature of statistics, that most of the studies 
… include analyses of qualitative data, particularly videotaped observations or 
interviews.” Yet such studies allow identification of different states of students’ 
reasoning abilities and subsequent stages in the developmental process. Our study 
chooses a different perspective based on individual differences in student-related factors 
by investigating the role of non-cognitive individual differences in the cognitive 
development of students. This type of study has, at least in the context of statistics and 
mathematics education, a long tradition (Gal & Garfield, 1997; McLeod, 1992). In 
conceptualizing the non-cognitive domains of education, McLeod (1992) distinguishes 
among emotions, attitudes and beliefs. In most studies of learning processes in statistical 
education, the focus is on beliefs and attitudes, rather than emotions; see for example Gal 
and Ginsburg (1994) and Gal and Garfield (1997). Probably the best known, and 
certainly most validated, model on the role of attitudes in learning statistics is the model 
developed by Schau and co-authors (Schau, Stevens, Dauphinee & DeVecchio 1995). 
The Schau-model is based on the expectancy-value model for achievement motivations 
designed by Eccles and Wigfield (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000, 
2002). In that model, students’ expectancies for success and the value they contribute to 
succeeding are important determinants of their motivation to perform achievement tasks. 
Expectancy for success crystallizes in two different concepts: belief in one’s own ability 
to perform a task, and a perception of the task demand. Subjective task value is generally 
modeled in a single concept, comprising several aspects: attainment value (importance of 
doing well on a task), intrinsic value (interest in and enjoyment gained from doing the 
task), utility value (usefulness), and costs (spent efforts) (Eccles, 2005). The contribution 
of Schau and co-authors to the development of the expectancy-value model of 
achievement motivations is two-fold. First, they designed the SATS measurement 
instrument to adapt the generic expectancy-value model to the statistical domain (Schau 
et al., 1995; Dauphinee, Schau & Stevens, 1997). Second, they extended the generic 
model by introducing new concepts obtained by disentangling the broad task-value 
concept of the expectancy-value model. In the first 28-item version of SATS, the task-
value concept is broken up into an affective concept, focusing most on the enjoyment 
aspect of intrinsic values, and a valuation concept, focusing on the remaining components 
of attainment and utility values. The model of the first version thus contains two 
expectancy factors that deal with students’ beliefs about their own ability and perceived 
task difficulty, Cognitive Competence and Difficulty, and two subjective task-value 
concepts that encompass students’ feelings toward and attitudes about the value of the 
subject, Affect and Value (Schau, 2003). Empirical research, both within the statistics 81 
 
 
domain (Dauphinee et al., 1997; Sorge & Schau, 2002; Hilton, Schau, & Olsen, 2004) 
and in other academic domains (Tempelaar, Gijselaers, Schim van der Loeff, & Nijhuis, 
2007) supports the distinction of these affective and valuation aspects. In a second, 36-
item version of SATS (C. Schau, personal communication, November 30, 2003), two 
more concepts are introduced: Interest and Effort. The Interest concept shapes the interest 
aspect of the intrinsic value component in the expectancy-value model, whereas the 
Effort concept shapes the perceived costs component in the subjective task-value (Eccles, 
2005). To the knowledge of the authors, no empirical studies based on the extended 
SATS instrument have yet been published. Empirical studies of the 28-item version of 
SATS, referred to above, focus on the structure of attitudes alone, or on the structure of 
attitudes in relation to statistics course performances. The context of these studies is 
thereby slightly different from most studies in the expectancy-value framework that focus 
primarily on the relation between attitudes and learning task choices (such as course 
selection) rather than learning task outcomes. 
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate the dependency of students’ prior 
reasoning abilities on their attitudes toward statistics when entering an introductory 
statistics course. In the formulation of this research question, attitudes are hypothesized to 
be causal to statistical reasoning abilities. The hypothesized direction of causality is in 
agreement with process models of learning (see for example Garfield, Hogg, Schau, & 
Whittinghill, 2002), in which affective, student-related factors are regarded as 
determinants for cognitive, learning-outcome-related factors. In addition, attitudinal 
variables possess a trait-like nature, in contrast to reasoning abilities that possess a state-
like nature. Therefore, the hypothesized causal direction follows the general modeling 
pattern of stable traits determining malleable states. In order to do so we start the 
empirical third section by developing confirmatory latent factor models for attitudes, 
based on the extended SATS instrument, and for statistical reasoning, based on the SRA 
instrument. Subsequently, these factor models are integrated into a full structural 
equation model that explains reasoning abilities by attitude factors. To be able to put this 
relationship into perspective, two further cognitive constructs are added to this model: 
course performance measured by quiz and final exam scores. This extension allows 
characterizing reasoning abilities not only by their direct relationship with attitudinal 
variables, but also by a comparison of that relationship with the ones between attitudes 
and course performances.  
One of the implications of our model is that where different learning approaches 
provide alternative routes to achieve traditional course performances, perhaps one more 
efficiently than the others but all contributing to the same learning goal, this seems not to 
be true for statistical reasoning abilities. Some learning approaches really hinder 
achievement of reasoning skills. The model outcomes thus have strong implications for 
the development of instructional programs in statistical reasoning, which is one of the 
topics discussed in the concluding section. 
 
2.  METHOD 
 
2.1.  PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
In this study, the statistical reasoning of students participating in the “International 
Business” and “International Economics” programs of the Maastricht University was 
investigated. A large number of students, 842 and 776 respectively, from these two 
programs participated in the first year, first semester course Quantitative Methods (QM) 
in 2004/05 and 2005/06. This is a compulsory introduction to mathematics and statistics 82 
 
 
for all students. Of these 1618 students, 64% were male and 36% were female. Another 
relevant decomposition was that 39% students had a Dutch secondary school diploma, 
versus 61% students with non-Dutch diplomas (most of them of German nationality).  
Part of the data analyzed in this study comes from regular student quizzes and 
examinations. In the QM course, three assessment instruments are applied. One is a final 
exam, in multiple-choice format, covering both statistics and mathematics. Items in the 
exam focus on students’ ability to apply statistical and mathematical methods; those in 
statistics are motivated by the Advanced Placement Statistics exams (e.g., 
http://apcentral.collegeboard.com). Secondly, both for statistics and mathematics, three 
quizzes are taken spread over the eight weeks of the course. Quizzes are optional; they 
give rise to bonus points for the exam score. In practice, all students participate in most of 
the quizzes. For this study, quiz scores are aggregated over the three quizzes. The third 
assessment instrument is a student project. For this project, students collect personal data 
by completing several self-report instruments concerning their study approach and 
preferred strategies. Later on, they perform an explorative analysis of these data. Students 
are informed that the self-reported data are also used for three additional purposes: to 
provide study advice to students who have adopted an inefficient study approach, for 
course-improvement purposes, and for research. The project is compulsory, and assessed 
with pass/fail. Because students can acquire feedback on their project in several stages of 
its development, the final assessment of it is not very informative, and is not included in 
this study. 
 The SATS and the SRA were the first self-report instruments to be administered 
during the first days of the course. Responses to both surveys therefore reflect students’ 
prior attitudes and beliefs toward statistics and their prior reasoning abilities. Scores 
cannot be influenced by impressions of the educational process, nor by knowledge 
achieved in the course itself. 
Both instruments are quantitative in nature, and generate observations that can be 
regarded as proxies for the underlying, but unobservable, theoretical constructs. 
Therefore, the investigation of the relationship between attitudes and reasoning abilities 
requires the estimation of two confirmatory latent factor models for attitudes on the one 
side, and for statistical reasoning on the other, as well as the integration of both these 
factor models into a full structural equation model. To this model, we add two indicators 
of course performance: latent variables measuring the strongly cognitive-based scores in 
the final exam, and the more effort-based scores in quizzes. The primary reason for doing 
so is that it allows for characterization of the particular position statistical reasoning takes 
within the spectrum of different performance indicators. 
 
2.2.  MEASURES 
 
Statistical reasoning abilities The Statistical Reasoning Assessment (SRA) is a test 
consisting of 20 multiple-choice or multiple-answer items developed by Konold and 
Garfield as part of a project evaluating the effectiveness of a new statistics curriculum in 
U.S. high schools (Konold, 1989; Garfield, 1996, 1998a, 2003). Each item in the SRA 
describes a statistics or probability problem and offers four to eight choices of responses. 
Most responses include a statement of reasoning, explaining the rationale for a particular 
choice. For every item, one response corresponds to a category of correct reasoning; all or  
most of the other responses correspond to categories of misconceptions. For a full 
description of the individual items and the eight correct reasoning scales and eight 
misconceptions scales, see Garfield (1998a, 2003); Table 1 summarizes the scales of the 
description of the individual items and the eight correct reasoning scales and eight 83 
 
 
Table 1. SRA Correct reasoning scales and misconceptions scales; 
based on Garfield (2003). 
 
Correct Reasoning Scales:  
Prob: Correctly interprets probabilities. Assesses the understanding and use of ideas of 
randomness and chance to make judgments about uncertain events. 
Aver: Understands how to select an appropriate average. Assesses the understanding of what 
measures of center tell about a data set, and which are best to use under different 
conditions. 
Comp: Correctly computes probability, both understanding probabilities as ratios, and using 
combinatorial reasoning. Assesses the knowledge that in uncertain events not all 
outcomes are equally likely, and how to determine the likelihood of different events 
using an appropriate method. 
Indep: Understands independence.  
Sampl: Understands sampling variability.  
Correl: Distinguishes between correlation and causation. Assesses the knowledge that a 
strong correlation between two variables does not mean that one causes the other. 
2Way: Correctly interprets two-way tables. Assesses the knowledge of how to judge and 
interpret a relationship between two variables, knowing how to examine and interpret 
a two-way table. 
LrgS: Understands the importance of large samples. Assesses the knowledge of how samples 
are related to a population and what may be inferred from a sample; knowing that a 
larger, well-chosen sample will more accurately represent a population; being 
cautious when making inferences made on small samples. 
 
Misconception scales: 
AverMc: Misconceptions involving averages. This category includes the following pitfalls: 
believing averages are the most common number; failing to take outliers into 
consideration when computing the mean; comparing groups based on their averages 
only; and confusing mean with median. 
OutcO: Outcome orientation. Students use an intuitive model of probability that leads them 
to make yes or no decisions about single events rather than looking at the series of 
events; see Konold (1989). 
High%: Good samples have to represent a high percentage of the population. Size of the 
sample and how it is chosen are not important, but it must represent a large part of 
the population to be a good sample. 
Small: Law of small numbers. Small samples best resemble the populations from which they 
are sampled, so are to be preferred over larger samples. 
Repre: Representativeness misconception. In this misconception the likelihood of a sample is 
estimated based on how closely it resembles the population. Documented in 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky (1982). 
Cause: Correlation implies causation. 
EquiPr: Equiprobability bias. Events of unequal chance tend to be viewed as equally likely; 
see Lecoutre (1992). 
Groups: Groups can be compared only if they have the same size. 
 
description of the individual items and the eight correct reasoning scales and eight 
misconceptions scales, see Garfield (1998a, 2003); Table 1 summarizes the scales of the 
instrument. In the design process of the instrument, the authors included several stages 
directed at achieving good validity and reliability. With regard to criterion-related 
validity, Garfield (2003) reports extremely low correlations with different course 
outcomes, suggesting statistical reasoning and misconceptions are unrelated to course 
performance. In addition, Garfield (2003) reports satisfactory test-retest reliabilities, but 84 
 
 
low internal consistency reliability coefficients, implying that scales and misconception 
scales respectively appear not to measure one single ability or trait.  
In terms of the classification into the more recently developed categories of statistical 
literacy, reasoning, and thinking, the allocation of individual reasoning abilities and 
misconceptions to these three classes is not obvious. Aver, TWay, AverMc, High%, and 
Groups refer to basic data-related skills, and seem to fit best in the literacy category. At 
the other extreme, Comp, Sampl, Correl, Small, Cause, and EquiPr involve probability 
and statistical theory related concepts, and might better suit the thinking category. The 
remaining scales, referring to notions of probability and uncertainty, would then fit the 
reasoning category. We return to this issue when discussing descriptive statistics of SRA 
data obtained from this study and a limited number of other studies that provide empirical 
data on the instrument: Garfield (1998b, 2003), Garfield and Chance (2000), Liu (1998) 
and Sundre (2003). 
 
Attitudes and beliefs toward statistics Attitudes are measured with the Survey of 
Attitudes Toward Statistics (SATS) developed by Schau and co-authors (Schau et al., 
1995; Dauphinee et al., 1997). There are two existing versions of the SATS, both 
consisting of seven-point Likert-type items measuring aspects of post-secondary students’ 
statistics attitudes. The 28-item version of SATS contains four scales, as indicated below. 
Each scale is accompanied by two examples of items, one positively and one negatively 
worded: 
•  Affect (six items) - measuring positive and negative feeling concerning statistics, 
the enjoyment aspect of intrinsic value: I like statistics; I am scared by statistics. 
•  Cognitive Competence (six items) - measuring attitudes about intellectual 
knowledge and skills when applied to statistics, the self-concept of one’s ability 
component in the expectancy-value model: I can learn statistics; I have no idea of 
what’s going on in statistics. 
•  Value (nine items) - measuring attitudes about the usefulness, relevance, and worth 
of statistics in personal and professional life, the utility and attainment components 
of task value: I use statistics in my everyday life; I will have no application for 
statistics in my profession. 
•  Difficulty (seven items) - measuring attitudes about the difficulty of statistics as a 
subject, the perception of the task demand: Statistics formulas are easy to 
understand; Statistics is highly technical. 
Schau et al. (1995), Dauphinee et al. (1997), and Harris and Schau (1999) elaborate 
on the development process of the instrument. The instrument is freely available from the 
internet (Schau, Dauphinee, Del Vecchio, & Stevens, 1999). Validation research in two 
very large samples of undergraduate students has shown that a four-factor structure 
provides a good description of responses to the SATS-instrument (Dauphinee et al., 
Hilton et al., 2004).  
Recently, Schau has developed a 36-item version of the SATS, containing two 
additional scales, each covered by four, positively worded, items (Schau, personal 
communication, November 30, 2003). These scales, with one item example, are  
•  Interest (four items) - students’ level of individual interest in statistics, the interest 
aspect of intrinsic value: I am interested in learning statistics. 
•  Effort (four items) - amount of work the student expends to learn statistics, the 




2.3.  DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Parceling The very first step in the data analysis is to reverse the negatively worded 
items in the SATS instrument, such that for all items a higher score corresponds to a more 
positive attitude. This step is worthwhile to mention because it requires attentiveness in 
the interpretation of the construct Difficulty. High scores for Difficulty express a more 
positive attitude, implying that a better name for the Difficulty scale would have been 
‘perceived lack of difficulty.’ The second step of analysis is the parceling of the SATS 
data, following earlier empirical work by Schau and co-authors (Schau et al., 1995; 
Dauphinee et al., 1997; Hilton et al., 2004). The technique of item parceling, where items 
from the same subscale are aggregated into several parcels or miniscales, has been 
adopted in empirical studies for several reasons: to obtain more continuous and normally 
distributed observed data, to reduce the number of model parameters to achieve a more 
attractive variable to sample size ratio, and to get more stable parameter estimates 
(Bandalos, 2002; Hau & Marsh, 2004; Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998).  
In parceling items, Hau and Marsh (2004) advise not to reduce the number of 
indicators for each latent construct beyond a minimum of three. Next, they recommend to 
counterbalance skewness in the presence of strong non-normality by creating parcels out 
of item pairs with opposite skew. In order to determine the relevance of this 
recommendation of counterbalancing skewness for our data set, the degree of non-
normality of the data was calculated as a preliminary step to parceling. In the data of the 
first four SATS factors, no indications of non-normality were found in any of the self-
reported questionnaires beyond Hau and Marsh’s (2004) category of ‘moderately non-
normal,’ implying skew = 1.0 and kurtosis = 1.5. Items corresponding to the constructs 
Interest and especially Effort were however much more strongly skewed.  
In the empirical analyses of their 28-item SATS data, Schau et al. (1995), Dauphinee 
et al. (1997), and Hilton et al. (2004) adopt an item parceling scheme based on balancing 
with respect to the positively and negatively worded items, size of parcel means, standard 
deviations, and skew (see Schau et al.). Their parceling solution contains two parcels for 
Affect, Cognitive Competence, and Difficulty each; only Value contains three. Given the 
rule of thumb of at least three parcels per factor and the advice to counterbalance skew as 
much as possible, it was decided to apply a parceling scheme different from Schau and 
co-authors, based only on skewness, and resulting in exactly three parcels per factor. 
 
Statistical analyses This study integrates several techniques of structural equation 
modeling (SEM). A SEM model is distinct from a path or regression model in that it 
hypothesizes that crucial variables, such as attitudes in this study, are not directly 
observable and are better modeled as latent variables than as observable ones. In doing 
so, a SEM model makes it possible to distinguish two different types of errors: errors in 
equations, as does the path model, and errors in the observation of variables. Making this 
distinction is especially worthwhile when errors in important constructs have rather 
different sizes. Studying reliabilities of several achievement motivations, and their 
variation over subjects, suggests that this argument applies to this study. In this study, 
SEM models were estimated with LISREL (version 8.54) using maximum likelihood 
estimation. For further discussion of SEM see for example Byrne (1998), Kline (2005), 
and Schumacker and Lomax (2004). 
The standard approach to estimate a SEM distinguishes two steps (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2004). In the first phase of the two-step model building approach, measurement 
models for all latent variables in the model are estimated. Measurement models are in 
general factor models that allow factors, also called traits, and the uniqueness, that is the 86 
 
 
errors in indicators, to be correlated. In our study, we need to estimate three of such 
‘correlated trait’ (CT), ‘correlated uniqueness’ (CU), and ‘confirmatory factor analysis’ 
(CFA) models: for the SATS data, for the SRA data, and for course performance data. In 
the second model building step, the structural part of the SEM is estimated. This 
structural part specifies the relationships between the independent and dependent latent 
variables. In contrast to the estimation of the measurement models, the estimation of 
structural relationships is to some extent explorative in nature. The structural part of the 
full structural equation model is not a priori restricted, except for several hypotheses with 
regard to the direction of the relationship. For the estimation of these structural parts, two 
different model modification procedures are applied. The first is called model trimming 
(Kline, 2005) or backward search (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Starting from a full 
matrix of structural path coefficients, one by one, parameters are restricted to zero if they 
prove non-significant, until all remaining structural parameters are significant. The 
second approach is called model building (Kline, 2005) or forward search (Schumacker 
& Lomax, 2004). It starts from a zero matrix of structural paths coefficients, and frees 
parameters one by one, in the order indicated by the value of the modification indices, up 
to point where no more significant improvement in fit is achieved. Because in both 
approaches subsequent models are nested, the chi-square difference statistic can be used 
to assess model fit. In all five subjects, both forward and backward searches converge to 
the same final model. Model modification is a form of explorative analysis, and brings 
along the risk of capitalization on chance.  
With large sample sizes as in our study, the χ
2 test statistic is known to always reject 
in any formal test of significance (Byrne, 1998; Marsh & Yeung, 1996). For that reason, 
and following Marsh and Yeung (1996), and Hilton et al. (2004), emphasis is placed on 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Goodness-of-Fit Index 
(GFI), the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI; termed Tucker-Lewis Index or TLI in Marsh & 
Yeung, 1996), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Relative Fit Index (RFI, termed 
Relative Noncentrality Index or RNI in Marsh & Yeung, 1996), and the normed version 
of the χ
2 test statistic: χ
2/df. For the last index, no clear-cut guidelines exist; values in the 
range of 2.0 to 5.0 are acceptable, with lower values indicating better fit. For RMSEA, 
values ≤ 0.05 indicate good fit, values ≤ 0.08 indicate reasonable fit. The indices GFI, 
NNFI, CFI, and RFI, all normally lie in the range 0.0 – 1.0, with higher values indicating 
better fit. As a benchmark for good fit, the value 0.90 is often used (Kline, 2005). 
The covariance matrixes required for estimation are available from the authors upon 
request. 
 
3.  RESULTS 
 
3.1.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ATTITUDES AND BELIEVES TOWARD 
STATISTICS 
 
Descriptive statistics of the SATS scales are exhibited in Table 2 and Figure 1. All 
attitudes are measured using a Likert 1-7 scale. Because all scale means, except for 
Difficulty, are larger than the neutral value of four, students in our sample express 
positive attitudes toward statistics for Affect, Cognitive Competence, Value, Interest, and 
Effort. Means and standard deviations are in line with values reported in Schau (2003) 
found as pre-test scores in a large class of undergraduate U.S. students; Affect, Cognitive 
Competence, and Value are slightly more positive in our sample, Difficulty is equal. In 
comparing our European data with data from U.S. studies, it is important to realize that 
participants in our study are all in economics and business programs. These programs 87 
 
 
require students to take math classes in high school through at least intermediate level. 
Cronbach α reliability coefficients of these four scales are satisfactory, and again in line 
with intervals of values reported in Schau (2003) from several empirical studies by Schau 
and co-researchers. No empirical studies exist at this moment that incorporate the new 
scales of the 36-item SATS version: Interest and Effort. In our study, both these attitudes 
are clearly positive on average, with (planned) Effort taking a very strong position with a 
mean of 6.37 on a 1-7 scale. Figure 1 indicates that due to the high scores on Effort, 
skewness is an issue for this scale, and not for the other scales. 
 
Table 2. Scale means, standard deviations, and Cronbach α’s for attitudes toward 
statistics in our study (n=1458) and as reference, values reported in Schau (2003) 
 
 Mean  (Standard  deviation)  Cronbach α 
  this study  Schau (2003)  this study  Schau (2003) 
Affect  4.52 (1.10)  4.03 (1.14)  0.82  0.80 – 0.89 
Cognitive Competence  5.08 (0.89)  4.91 (1.09)  0.78  0.77 – 0.88 
Value  5.05 (0.83)  4.86 (1.01)  0.78  0.74 – 0.90 
Difficulty  3.59 (0.77)  3.62 (0.78)  0.68  0.64 – 0.81 
Interest 5.07  (0.99)    0.80   
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3.2.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF STATISTICAL REASONING ABILITIES 
 
Descriptive statistics of the SRA data, similar to those reported in Garfield (1998b, 
2003), Garfield and Chance (2000) and Liu (1998), are exhibited in Table 3. Because the 
maximum score of the several scales varies with the total number of answer options 
corresponding to the scale, the table presents the means of the several scales expressed as 
a proportion, that is, on a [0-1] scale. In addition to scores on eight reasoning skills, and 
eight misconceptions, the aggregated correct reasoning score (Correct) and aggregated 
misconceptions (Misconcep) are reported. The aggregated scores are obtained in the same 
way as in the studies by Garfield and co-authors by taking the sum over all correct 
reasoning and misconception items, and re-expressing them as a proportion. Because the 
number of items per scale ranges from 1 to 5, different scales have a different weight in 
the total score, so aggregated scores are to be regarded as weighted averages. Data 
reported by Garfield and co-authors are restricted to means. 
 
Table 3. Scale means and standard deviations for statistical reasoning abilities in our 
study (n=1499) and as reference, post-course values US college students reported in 
Garfield (2003) 
 
  Mean (Standard deviation)    Mean (Standard deviation) 
  this study  Garfield (2003)    this study  Garfield (2003) 
Prob  0.75 (0.29)  0.68  AverMc  0.46 (0.27)  0.30 
Aver  0.71 (0.27)  0.61  OutcO  0.22 (0.17)  0.23 
Comp  0.40 (0.25)  0.46  High%  0.15 (0.23)  0.09 
Indep  0.64 (0.29)  0.63  Small  0.28 (0.27)  0.29 
Sampl  0.28 (0.30)  0.22  Repre  0.12 (0.22)  0.17 
Correl   0.66 (0.47)  0.51  Cause  0.28 (0.37)  0.10 
Twow  0.74 (0.40)  0.65  EquiPr  0.57 (0.33)  0.56 
LrgS  0.71 (0.33)  0.68  Groups  0.29 (0.46)  0.60 
Correct  0.58 (0.13)  0.55  Misconcep  0.29 (0.10)  0.27 
 
Outcomes of our study and those reported in Garfield (2003) are remarkably similar, 
although the composition of groups of participating students is rather different. Garfield’s 
study refers to U.S. college students surveyed at the end of an introductory course 
statistics, our study to European university students at the start of such an introductory 
course. Of the correct reasoning scales, Prob and Twow are amongst those with highest 
mastery level, and Comp and Sampl with lowest. Of the misconception scales, EquiPr 
and Groups are high in all studies (in our sample, Groups somewhat less), and High%, 
Repre and Cause are low. 
Conceptions for which we find higher scores than reported in the Garfield studies are 
Aver, Correl, and Twow. The misconception for which our data indicate a remarkably 
low relative score is Groups. Of these four scales, three are characterized earlier as being 
part of the category of statistical literacy. This agrees with the difference in timing of the 
instrument, as a pre-test in our study, and a post-test in other studies. Not (recently) 
educated in introductory statistics, it is not surprising that students in our study score 
relatively high on statistical literacy components, but low on a statistical thinking related 
component as MC6 (correlation implies causation), typically an important concept to be 
taught in an introductory course.  
As a last observation on average levels of reasoning skills and misconceptions, the 
high rate of correct answers is noticeable. Of the eight correct reasoning skills, five have 89 
 
 
means of above 65% correct. Of the eight misconception scales, only two have means 
larger than 30%. 
 
3.3.  MEASUREMENT MODEL OF ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS TOWARD 
STATISTICS 
 
As a first step in the modeling of the SATS data, an explorative factor analysis was 
performed (principal components, varimax rotation). The eigenvalue criterion identifies 
six factors. The scree-criterion demonstrates a large jump at four factors, and a smaller 
jump at six factors. The newly created scales Interest and Effort clearly qualify as 
independent factors. The same is true for the scale Value. However, items in the scales 
Affect, Cognitive Competence, and Difficulty are strongly correlated. This finding 
coincides with other empirical studies on SATS: Schau et al. (1995), Dauphinee et al. 
(1997), Hilton et al. (2004), and Cashin and Elmore (2005). On the basis of these high 
correlations, Cashin and Elmore (2005) decide to reduce the three scales Affect, 
Cognitive Competence, and Difficulty into one latent factor, whereas in the other three 
studies they are modeled as separate, but correlated, latent factors. We followed the last 
approach estimating a six-factor confirmatory factor model on parcelled attitudes data 
allowing a correlated traits (CT) structure but without cross-loadings in the factor loading 
matrix and no correlated uniqueness (CU) factor. Table 4 contains fit indices of this CT 
factor model, Figure 2 the structure of the factor model, including estimated trait 
correlations. 
 




2  df RMSEA  GFI  NNFI  CFI  RFI 
CT 6CFA model   701.80  123  .057  .95  .97  .97  .96 
 
Fit indices indicate that the hypothesized correlated traits factor model fits the data 
quite well. Having confirmed the six-factor model, the correlation structure of latent 
factors depicted in Table 5 deserves prime interest. Table 5 demonstrates that twelve out 
of fifteen trait correlations are significant. Only three trait correlations appear to be non-
significant and are restricted to zero in the estimation of the final version of the factor 
model, with the other correlations freed. 
 
Table 5. Estimated latent factor correlations of attitudes toward statistics 
 
 Affect  Cognitive 
Competence 
Value Difficulty  Interest  Effort 
Affect 1.00           
Cognitive Competence  0.80  1.00         
Value 0.40  0.43  1.00       
Difficulty 0.61  0.62  -  1.00     
Interest 0.42  0.35  0.63  -  1.00   
Effort -  0.17  0.34  -0.28  0.44  1.00 




Figure 2. Correlated traits factor model as measurement model for attitudes toward 
statistics. Values are standardized parameter estimates. All values shown are statistically 
significant, p < 0.05. AFFECT, Affect; COGNC, Cognitive Competence; VALUE, Value; 
DIFFIC, Difficulty; INTEREST, interest; EFFORT, (planned) effort. 
 
When interpreting the trait correlation structure, the first issue that comes up is the 
effect of disentangling the broad task value concept into Affect, related to liking the 
subject, and Value, related to the importance attached to the subject. The correlation 
between latent factors Affect and Value (r = 0.40) is, relative to other correlations, 
modest. This indicates that Affect and Value are clearly empirically distinguishable 
constructs. The correlation between Value and Difficulty is insignificant, indicating that 
the attached value is independent to the lack of perceived difficulty. A third observation 
refers to the by far largest correlation, namely between Affect and Cognitive 
Competence. This is in itself a remarkable fact: Affect is achieved by decomposing the 
task value component into affective and utility-related factors, but from this analysis it 
appears that Affect is much more strongly related to the expectancy component Cognitive 91 
 
 
Competence, than to Value. This once again confirms the usefulness of the affect 
extension of the expectancy-value model. The strong correlation we found is comparable 
to the results found in Dauphinee et al. (1997) and Hilton et al. (2004).  
The relationship between the two factors Interest and Effort and the other four factors 
is primarily through Value. Interest is unrelated to Difficulty, and Effort is unrelated to 
Affect and negatively related to Difficulty. That last negative relationship seems to be an 
consequence of rational study behavior; students who regard statistics as difficult plan to 
invest more study effort than students regarding the subject as less difficult. However, it 
is at odds with the expectancy-value model, where that relation has the opposite sign. The 
different outcome is best explained by the context in which the model is used; whereas 
the expectancy-value model is primarily based on the selection of learning tasks (such as 
choosing one course in favor of another), the context of this study is the intensity of 
performance, given the required learning tasks. In the expectancy-value model, Effort is 
assumed to be an intermediate outcome variable. For this interpretation to be true, the 
correlations between Effort and its predictors are expected to be strongly positive. This is 
not the case, except possibly for Interest. Two potential explanations for the weaker than 
expected relationship between Effort and its predictors are available. First, Effort is an 
ex-ante measure, and planned effort might quite well diverge strongly from ex-post 
measured, realized effort. Second, planned Effort scores seem to be a composition of two 
rather different underlying mechanisms that can make the relationships of this variable to 
other attitudinal constructs ambiguous. On the one side, students with high achievement 
motivation are assumed to spend large efforts in their learning, so planned effort acts as a 
proxy for achievement motivation. On the other side, planned effort might act as a proxy 
for students’ learning approaches; students with a tendency to a memorizing type of 
learning tend to invest more effort in their learning than students with a learning approach 
focused on understanding. In general, the latter deep learning approach is regarded as 
better, and at least more efficient, than the first mentioned surface learning approach. For 
that reason, it might be expected that students with a tendency towards deep learning will 
have more positive attitudes, making deep learning positively related to the several 
attitudinal variables, and surface learning negatively related. If this is true, the 
relationship between Effort and attitudinal variables is the result of two counterbalancing 
forces: higher planned effort levels when being motivated, but lower planned effort levels 
when relying on efficient, deep learning approaches. In the subsection discussing the 
outcomes of the full structural equation model, we further elaborate on this issue. 
 
3.4.  MEASUREMENT MODEL OF STATISTICAL REASONING ABILITIES 
 
Previous empirical studies of the SRA instrument have used aggregated correct 
conceptions, and aggregated misconceptions, as scales, with the eight correct reasoning 
ability scores and the eight misconception scores as items. This would suggest a 
measurement model with the two aggregated reasoning abilities as latent constructs, and 
the correct reasoning ability and aggregated variables as indicators. However, Garfield 
(1998b), Garfield and Chance (2000) and Liu (1998) point out that this modeling 
approach has important drawbacks. In their studies, as in ours, the correlations between 
reasoning ability scores are low, mostly insignificant, and quite often of opposite signs. 
This is problematic in terms of scale construction, because it gives rise to low values of 
instrument reliability. In the present data set analyzed in this study, the Cronbach-α 
reliability of the correct reasoning scales is 0.34, whereas for the misconception scales, 
the reliability α is 0.10. These values are too low to warrant meaningfulness of 
aggregated constructs. Elsewhere, we have investigated the reliability of aggregated 92 
 
 
scales for a much larger sample, and have come to similar conclusions (Tempelaar, 
2004). Deleting individual items with extreme p-values, as suggested in Liu (1998), 
appears to have little impact on reliabilities in our data.  
Inspection of the correlation matrix depicted in Table 6 does however expose a 
pattern in correlations that suggests an alternative approach for modelling the outcomes 
of the SRA-instrument. Correlations within the group of correct reasoning scales, and 
within the group of misconceptions are, without exception, low. However, in the 
rectangular part of the correlation matrix containing the correlations between correct 
reasoning skills and misconceptions, seven out of eight columns contain exactly one 
highly significant and strongly negative correlation. This is not surprising; from the 
definition of for example Prob and OutcO, it is apparent that outcome orientation, that is 
the use of an intuitive and incorrect probability model, is at odds with correctly 
interpreting probabilities. And in some cases, the strong negative correlations between 
several correct conceptions and misconceptions find their origin in the fact that the 
concepts are based on different options of the same multiple choice items, which would 
lead to negative correlations by construct (although several multiple choice items allow 
for multiple answers). 
 
Table 6. Correlations between SRA correct reasoning and misconceptions scales being 
significant at p = 0.01; values in bold exceed 0.30 in absolute value 
 
  Prob  Aver  Comp  Indep Sampl  Correl  Twow LrgS 
Prob 1.00             
Aver    1.00            
Comp 0.09    1.00           
Indep   0.08  -0.16  1.00        
Sampl   0.10  0.08  -0.07  1.00     
Correl 0.09  0.17       1.00    
Twow 0.13  0.13       0.09  1.00  
LrgS   0.10  0.09    0.07  0.09  0.09  1.00 
AverMc  -0.43     -0.26       
OutcO  -0.42   -0.22  -0.13       -0.32 
High%           0.08    0.11 
Small   -0.10  -0.09  0.07  -0.69     -0.16 
Repre     -0.21  -0.69  0.08      
Cause   -0.08      -0.07  -0.46    
EquiPr     -0.80  0.20 -0.12  0.09     
Groups                
 AverMc  OutcO  High%  Small  Repre  Cause  EquiPr  Groups 
AverMc 1.00               
OutcO   1.00          
High%     1.00          
Small     1.00        
Repre         1.00      
Cause 0.14   -0.07  0.10  1.00     
EquiPr       0.12  -0.10    1.00   
Groups 0.07    0.09          1.00 
 
Taking this pattern of correlations into account, we suggest a different method of 
aggregating scales scores instead of calculating total correct and misconception scores. 
On the basis of the strong negative correlations between seven pairs of one correct 
reasoning scale and one misconception scale, a pair-wise aggregation process seems to be 
more appropriate than aggregation over all correct, and all incorrect answers. To 93 
 
 
investigate this option, an exploratory factor analysis was performed. This factor analysis 
resulted in a seven-factor solution, with five factors composed of pairs of one correct 
conception and one misconception, having factor loadings of opposite signs: Comp and 
EquiPr, Sampl and Small, Indep and Repre, Prob and OutcO, and Correl and Cause. The 
remaining two factors are composed of Aver, Twow, LrgS, and AverMc; and High% and 
Groups, respectively. All factor loadings have the expected signs: positive for correct 
conceptions, negative for misconceptions.  
Subsequently, a measurement model was estimated taking the outcome of the 
explorative factor analysis as its basis. No cross-loadings were allowed but, similar to the 
estimation of the attitudes measurement model, trait correlations were allowed. In 
addition, uniqueness correlations were allowed for those reasoning abilities and 
misconceptions that shared an item. Of the 21 trait correlations, only four appear to be 
significant. This does not come as a surprise, given the many insignificant correlations in 
Table 6. All 10 uniqueness correlations appear to be significant. The final measurement 
model for reasoning abilities is depicted in Figure 3; the fit indices of the final model are 
reported in Table 7. The fit of the CTCU 7 CFA model is good. 
 
Figure 3. Correlated traits, correlated uniqueness factor model as measurement model 
for statistical reasoning abilities. Values are standardized parameter estimates. All 




Table 7. Fit indices of seven-factor correlated traits confirmatory factor models of 
statistical reasoning abilities 
 
  χ
2  df RMSEA  GFI  NNFI  CFI  RFI 
CTCU 7CFA model   355.00  98  0.042  0.97  0.93  0.94  0. 90 
 
Judging from the good fit of this measurement model, an important conclusion with 
regard to the SRA instrument becomes apparent. When using SRA as an instrument to 
assess statistical reasoning, it is less attractive to aggregate all correct scales and all 
misconception scales into constructs like total correct reasoning and total misconceptions, 
given the limited reliability of such constructs. As an alternative, composing latent 
reasoning constructs on which both correct and misconception scales load seems to offer 
higher reliability.  
 
3.5.  FULL STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL OF ATTITUDE AND BELIEFS, 
STATISTICAL REASONING ABILITIES, AND COURSE PERFORMANCE 
 
The final step in the analysis regards the integration of both measurement models. 
This includes the not explicitly elaborated model for course performances, specifying the 
two latent course performances EXAM and QUIZ. Both course performance constructs 
are measured by two indicators: a score for mathematics and a score for statistics. The 
relationships that link the latent factors in the three measurement parts constitute the 
structural part of the model. The estimation of the structural parameters is similar to the 
estimation of trait correlations in the measurement models; no a priori restrictions apply 
as to what parameters are restricted to zero and which are set free. Two modification 
directions were applied: model building and model trimming. Both methods converge to 
the model depicted in Figure 4. Figure 4 does not make explicit the estimated correlations 
between latent factors; the same correlation structure as visible in Figures 2 and 3 was 
however used in the estimation of the full model. Table 8 reports fit indices of that model 
and indicates good fit. Table 9 describes the standardized parameter estimates or β-
coefficients of the structural part of the model. 
 
Table 8. Fit indices of full structural model of attitudes toward statistics, statistical 
reasoning abilities, and course performance 
 
  χ
2  df RMSEA  GFI  NNFI  CFI  RFI 
SEM   1599.26  620  0.035  0.94  0.96  0.97  0.94 
 
Table 9. Standardized estimates of the structural part of the full structural model of 
attitudes toward statistics, statistical reasoning abilities, and course performance 
 
 Affect  Cog  Comp  Value  Difficulty  Interest  Effort  SRA4 
SRA1           -0.10   
SRA2       0.09  -0.09  
SRA3          
SRA4     0.08    -0.10  
SRA5       0.18       
SRA6       0.10  -0.08     
SRA7     0.07    -0.12  
EXAM   0.39    -0.17      0.56 




Figure 4. Structural equation model of attitudes toward statistics, statistical reasoning abilities, and course performance. Values are 
standardized parameter estimates. All values shown are statistically significant, p < 0.05. AFFECT, Affect; COGNC, Cognitive Competence; 
VALUE, Value; DIFFIC, Difficulty; INTEREST, interest; EFFORT, (planned) effort, SRA1..7, latent reasoning factors; EXAM, QUIZ, latent 
course performance factors96 
 
 
The final structural model allows several interpretations. Students’ self-ability belief, 
Cognitive Competence, is a strong predictor of both latent course performance factors, 
with  β-values of 0.39 and 0.34. This is in agreement with many studies on the 
expectancy-value model, and self-concept or self-efficacy research. The relationships 
between statistical reasoning and the two course performance factors are weak, which is 
in line with the low correlations between SRA constructs and course performance found 
in several studies. In our study, only SRA4, the latent factor composed of four correct 
conceptions and misconceptions related to the ability to interpret probabilities, has a 
significant and strong impact on the latent exam factor. 
The second direct effect from attitudinal variables on course performances stems 
from the other expectancy construct of perceived task demand: (lack of) Difficulty. The 
relationship is reversed, with β-values of -0.17. This outcome is somewhat surprising; the 
expectancy-value model would predict a positive relationship. However, the relationship 
is robust; using a split-sample approach (and path analysis), it is confirmed in subsamples 
composed in several ways. The bivariate relationship between Difficulty and performance 
is however absent; the negative relation we find is present only in a simultaneous relation 
between Cognitive Competence, Difficulty, and course performance. It should thus be 
interpreted as a process of underestimation of task demand by students with an above 
average ability belief. 
The reduced form squared multiple correlations of both course performance latent 
factors EXAM and QUIZ are equal to 0.10. This means that the combined effect of both 
direct paths from SATS variables to EXAM and QUIZ, and the indirect paths from SATS 
via SRA to the two course performance factors, explains 10% of the total variation in 
both course performances. In the decomposition of explained variation into direct and 
indirect effects, it becomes clear that the contribution of the indirect effect can be 
ignored: less than 0.5%. The dominance of direct over indirect effects is due to the fact 
that relations between SATS and SRA are weak, and much weaker than relations between 
SATS and performance. In line with the expectancy-value model, attitudes have a 
positive impact on reasoning abilities through the variables Value and (perceived lack of) 
Difficulty. In contrast to predictions based on the expectancy-value model, the Effort 
variable has a negative impact on four of the seven latent reasoning factors. The negative 
relationship is consistent: β-coefficients of Effort to the several SRAs are either 
significantly negative, or zero, but never positive. Although a negative relation may 
appear counter-intuitive, it is in line with related research on the relationship between 
preferred learning approaches and reasoning abilities, where it was found that a tendency 
to surface learning negatively influences statistical reasoning (Tempelaar, 2004; 
Tempelaar, Gijselaers, & Schim van der Loeff, 2006; Tempelaar, Schim van der Loeff, 
Gijselaers, Crombrugghe, 2007). Planned effort being a proxy of both achievement 
motivation and a non-efficient learning approach (see the above discussion of the 
measurement model of attitudes), will give rise to diverse relationships between learning 
outcomes and the Effort variable. Learning performances that allow for alternative 
learning paths – such as memorizing versus understanding – are expected to demonstrate 
a positive relationship with planned effort. For these learning performances, the 
achievement motivation component in planned effort is dominant; students who are 
prepared to work hard will achieve better performances. In our study, quiz scores for both 
mathematics and statistics are the ultimate example of such type of course performances. 
Quizzes are designed to be accessible for all students and the bonus points they bring 
about are especially helpful for students at risk of not passing the course. This makes it 
plausible that the motivation component in planned effort dominates the learning 
approach component, which explains the positive relationship between Effort and Quiz. 97 
 
 
The opposite case is constituted by the SRA factors. Because the SRA is administered as 
an entry measurement unrelated to course grading, any direct effect of achievement 
motivation can assumed to be absent. And because statistical reasoning is not part of any 
secondary education of most students in this study, indirect effects – taking advantage of 
having been highly motivated in secondary school – will at most be very modest. As a 
result, the learning approach component in planned effort is expected to be dominant, 
which quite well explains the negative relationships found between EFFORT and four of 
the SRA factors. In this spectrum of course performances, the scores on the exam take an 
intermediate position. Being the course performance measurement, they certainly contain 
a strong achievement motivation component. At the same time, exams are certainly much 
less accessible than quizzes, which feeds the learning approach component. In the 
aggregation, the two effects are counterbalancing, which quite well might explain the 
latent factor EXAM being unrelated to Effort. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study the affect-extended version of the expectancy-value model (Schau et al., 
1995; Dauphinee et al., 1997; Hilton et al., 2004) was adopted as an achievement 
motivation model. Our data corroborate this extension, in the sense that affect and value 
turn out to be clearly distinguishable constructs, as well as in the sense that these 
variables play a distinctive role in the relationships with reasoning abilities and course 
performance. To our knowledge this study is the first to apply the 36-item SATS version, 
with the new scales Interest and Effort. Both scales appear to be a valuable addition to the 
instrument. The latent trait correlations in Table 5 demonstrate that the two factors are 
well identified constructs. However, correlational analysis suggests that Effort might be 
composed of two rather different characteristics. Therefore, a decomposition of this scale 
into an achievement motivation aspect and a learning approach aspect is called for. The 
latter aspect has the interpretation that students with a surface learning approach will 
typically achieve high scores on this Effort variable, because they invest large amounts of 
time for learning subjects by memorization.  
Through a factor-analytic study, we conclude that a factor model with most factors 
being composed of pairs of one reasoning ability and one misconception provides an 
appropriate measurement model. This shows that the SRA-instrument used by Garfield 
(1998b, 2003), Garfield and Chance (2000) and Liu (1998) is not flawed. In studies by 
these authors only two aggregate scales, one for statistical reasoning abilities and one for 
statistical misconceptions, are employed. They point out that these aggregate scales have 
shortcomings in view of the low values of correlations between the scales that constitute 
both aggregate scales, which results in low reliabilities. Our results imply that the finding 
of low correlations does not invalidate the instrument, but that alternative measurement 
models other than the one based on aggregate scales should be used.  
This study adds support to previous findings of the absence of a strong relationship of 
misconceptions and their counterpart, the reasoning abilities, with students’ course 
performances. This is demonstrated in studies where statistical reasoning is regarded as 
one of the several learning outcomes of the course and assessed simultaneously with 
these other course performances (Garfield, 1998b, 2003; Garfield and Chance, 2000; and 
Liu, 1998). In the present study along with those of Tempelaar (2004) and Tempelaar et 
al. (2006), it is also demonstrated in a second type of studies, where statistical reasoning 
is regarded as part of the prior knowledge state of the student and assessed before the start 
of the course. Are these studies, given their conclusions that SRA components are only 
weakly or even un-related to different course performance indicators, uninformative? We 98 
 
 
would argue that the opposite is true; exactly because of these absent relationships, they 
are informative. In general, different components of statistical knowledge, measured as 
course performance scores, tend to be substantially correlated. For example, in this study 
the correlation between latent course performance factors EXAM and QUIZ equals r = 
0.69. And investigating the relationships among three rather different types of course 
performances, final exam scores, quiz scores, and homework scores, we find similar 
substantial correlations. Because the SRA-instrument was developed to assess statistical 
reasoning mastery achieved in high school statistics programs, the natural hypothesis is 
that SRA-scores correlate with the several course performances in the same way as the 
other components of course performances do. But they clearly do not do so. It is these 
unexpected low correlations that make studies such as ours informative, rather than the 
case that the expected, substantial positive correlations would have been found. 
The absence of substantial relationships can be well explained in the context of naïve 
theories that are an element of the new theory of learning, as elaborated in Bruer’s (1993) 
‘Schools for thought.’ Naïve theories or misconceptions are informal, self-acquired 
elements of science knowledge, inconsistent with formal science. Students can possess 
formal knowledge and naïve knowledge at the same time; the learning of formal 
knowledge does not automatically imply that naïve knowledge is unlearned. In spite of 
having mastered the formal knowledge, students tend to solve scientific problems with 
their naïve knowledge, especially when they are confronted with these problems outside a 
school context. And, worst of all, formal knowledge tends to be forgotten much faster 
than naïve knowledge. Empirical outcomes of studies using the SRA-instrument are in 
line with these observations. Absence of substantive relationships is compatible with the 
hypothesis that both statistical reasoning abilities and statistical misconceptions are part 
of students’ naïve statistical knowledge; the first category naïve and correct, the second 
category naïve but incorrect. More research to investigate the role of naïve theories in 
learning and the development of naïve knowledge over time is necessary. This is 
particularly relevant because the reform movement in statistics education has called for a 
more prominent position of statistical reasoning, and the related domains of statistical 
literacy and thinking in the statistics curriculum. So it is the reformed curriculum, more 
than any traditional curriculum, that requires resolving the instructional challenge of 
unlearning statistical misconceptions before being able to replace them with proper 
reasoning abilities. 
Empirical studies as documented in special issues of SERJ (Ben-Zvi & Garfield, 
2004b; Garfield & Ben-Zvi, 2005) and in Ben-Zvi & Garfield (2005) conclude that in 
order to learn reasoning and to unlearn misconceptions, the use of specific educational 
tools is indispensable. This study suggests that the use of these tools is probably only part 
of the solution of the instructional challenge. A strong dependency on these instructional 
tools might be at odds with educational principles on which student-centered programs 
are based, in the sense that they limit students’ own responsibility to organize the learning 
process. The outcomes of this study might bring forward some further limitations. In 
most learning processes students enter the learning context with a given set of 
background characteristics, such as a preference for deep learning versus surface 
learning. Most of these contexts allow all students to achieve satisfactory learning 
outcomes, be it along different learning paths. As a concrete example, our structural 
equation model suggests that both surface learning oriented students and deep learning 
oriented students can achieve adequate course performance scores. But our empirical 
analyses also suggest that statistical reasoning might be the odd man out in this context; 
the learning of statistical reasoning seems not easily to assimilate to the variation in 
students’ background characteristics as preferred learning approach, as is the case with 99 
 
 
other cognitive goals. If this conclusion is correct, it implies we need an even broader 
range of educational tools than already described in the sources referred to earlier; more 
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